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THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BASIS OF ROMAN LAW*
I
For the past few years, there has been an increasing inter-
est in the study of jurisprudence. In the United States, as
well as in foreign countries, the bases of positive law have
been re-examined. This modem renaissance of jurisprudence
is just one of many revivals throughout the course of his-
tory. These periodic re-evaluations of the positive law al-
ways approximately coincide with great social upheavals and
restlessness, when men's principles and faith in the estab-
lished order of things are sorely tested. Perhaps the Great
War and the socially depressive era through which this na-
tion has passed have been the coactive pressures which have
produced the present widespread interest in the philosophy
of law. The most recent development of this subject relates
to the field of political philosophy and constitutional theory.
But as the concepts included in a philosophy of law are
fixed, though the means by which they are made effective
are variable, it is possible to apply modern jurisprudential
techniques to old systems of law. What were the theodicean,
ethical, and metaphysical controls of the Roman legal sys-
tem, for example, in reference to the judicial and legislative
processes, as distinguished from the mere content of specific,
technical segments of formulated rules, necessary adminis-
tratively for the well ordering of Roman society, and the su-
premacy of Roman authority? It will be seen that in the
Roman legal world, as in the Anglo-American, great socio-
economic movements, which necessitated a liquidation of
outmoded, solidified legal regulations, have forced legalists
to fall back on ultimates, by a re-appraisal of the positive
law in the light of specific, philosophical tenets.
*This paper was originally read before the Riccobono Seminar of Roman Law
in America, of which the author is Scriba (Secretary).
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The influences which mould law, determining its scope and
function, are at work everywhere, whether or not they are
consciously recognized. These stimuli are variable in char-
acter. They may proceed from the controlling norms of a
Divine Will, or Intellect, the ethics of some type of natural
law, the shifting opportunism of experimentalism, or the
fetish of a temporal, economic, material well-being for spe-
cific groups, or for the whole social group. The age and con-
tinuity of the Roman law, its survival under various forms
of political organization, and its success in many lands and
among divers peoples make it an excellent specimen for the
dissecting knife of the jurist who is in search of wisdom.
A philosophical interpretation of Roman law does not pre-
clude an over-lapping explanation from the viewpoints of
politics, sociology, or economics. Most likely all these factors
have contributed to the development of Roman law, perhaps
concurrently. Indeed, Roman law was based upon a non-
philosophic paganism, from the foundation of Rome in 754,
B. C., to the period of Servius Tullius' (566-52 B. C.). This
paganism was mythological, deifying the emotions and en-
dorsing irrational excesses, such as those included in the
worship of Bacchus, The earliest Romans did not develop a
philosophy of religion, a theodicy. Faith and Reason were
not integrated. Law was identified with Roman Paganism,
but not with reason. The will of the gods was then the basis
of law. "Fas" was the source of this most ancient Roman
law. It was the era of the Jus Quiritium.2
The next period was that of the Jus Civile, the law for cit-
izens, both Patricians and Plebians. With the inscription of
the Twelve Tables in the fifth century, B. C., Roman law
was no longer a Patrician mystery and monopoly. But dur-
ing the era of the Jus Civile the "oughtness" of the interven-
1 See: LOBINGIER, THE EVoLuTIoN OF THE ROMAN LAW (2d ed.) 11, 57 if;
SoHm, THE INSTITUTES or ROMAN LAW (4th ed. trans. from the German by
Ledlie) 15 n. 2, 28 n. 2.
2 LOBINGIER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 12 ff.
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tion of positive law was pivoted upon Roman citizenship.'
Inasmuch as the Jus Civile was intended only for Roman
citizens, and was referable to such concepts as race and re-
ligion, essentially it was not in sympathy with the jurispru-
dence of a natural law. It was fideistic and nationalistic, but
not rational. It sought to protect the rights, claims, and
equities of Roman pagans. Was the identification of the an-
cient pagan Roman religion with positive legal rule, without
reference to the intermediate element of Reason, chiefly re-
sponsible for the Romans refusing to apply the jus civile
to foreigners, or was the reason primarily social, racial, or
political?
But the Jus Civile, to the extent that it was an admission
of the necessity of the positive law's enforcement of equities
based upon the ethical personality of the individual, as dis-
tinguished from the personateness of the familial group, was
an advancement beyond the most primitive condition of
Roman jurisprudence. Then, apparently, there was domi-
nant a familial totalitarianism, in which the individual was
outside the purview of positive law, for at one time only
status existed between the members of the Roman family.4
A transition to a stage in which the rights of individuals be-
gan to be recognized may be interpreted as an ethical and
metaphysical change in the jurisprudential basis of Roman
law. A group ethics yielded to the ethics of an individuated
rationality. Metaphysically there was a piercing of the veil
of the reality of the corporealized kindred, and a juridical
acceptance of the actualistic personalities of ethical units.
As long as Roman society was not infiltrated by foreign-
ers, at first members of the old, neighboring, Italian tribes,
who went to Rome as traders, the juridical ethics sanction-
ing the conference of the benefits of legal processes, only in
so far as a person possessed a qualification of the positive
law, namely, citizenship, seemed adequate. But when alien
3 1 SimRAN, RomAN LAW fn THE MODERN WORLD (1917) 32-37.
4 MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1888) 178 ff.
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freemen began to demand a mechanism for the adjustment
of their alleged rights in reference to counter-equities, there
arose a broadened juristic conception.' Ultimately, the Rom-
an social and legal consciousness bowed to the powerful con-
trol of the natural law or reason.' The result was the rise of
the jus gentium (about 243 B. C.), which was a body of
positive law, made up of rules generally applicable among
the alien races in Rome, in virtue of natural reason. It was
invoked to determine juridical conflicts not only between
foreigners, but also between foreigners and Romans. It was
not statutory but customary.
Behind the legal, positive phase of the jus gentium, there
was a broad basis of rational speculation, with the central
core of a natural law.' Reason and humanity were the au-
thoritative bases of the jus gentium, while religious faith or
political expediency justified the intervention of the jus civi-
le. Greek philosophy, particularly Stoicism, and rhetoric
were utilized by the Roman legalists, at least from the first
century, B. C., onwards, in developing Roman jurisprudence.
To quote Professor Zulueta of Oxford University:
"Forms being national and intention universal, the practical needs
of an empire must in any case have given over the future to the jus
gentium, but the same period which saw the consolidation of the jus
gentium saw also the beginning of the reign of Greek thought at
Rome." 8
A distinction was made between the jus gentium and the jus
naturale. The former was positive law, while the latter com-
prehended the fixed, immutable, ethical and moral norms of
control, relative to human conduct.'
6 RADIN, HANDBOOx Or RoMAN LAW (1927) 37 ff.
6 See POUND, OUTLINES Or LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) 2.
7 See LOBINGIER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 110, where there is a reference to
INSTITUTES (Oaius) 1, 1, containing a description of the jus gentium by Gaius,
namely, "the rules constituted by natural reason for all are observed by all
nations alike and are called jus gentium."
8 ZULUETA, 9 THE CAmBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY, THE DrVMLOPMENT Or
LAW UNDER THE REPUBLIC (1932) 868.
9 BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE (1901) 575 ff. At p. 582,
he writes: "The blending of the notion of Natural Law, as the ethical standard
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BASIS OF ROMAN LAW 365
The history of Roman jurisprudence, in the sense of a
truly organized body of legal philosophy, dates from the
time of Cicero (106-43 B.C.). Then it was that the Roman
intellectual world felt the full impact of Greek culture and
rationalization."0 In several of his works, Cicero, devotee of
Stoic ethics, brought to the attention of Roman jurists the
philosophical bases of law. 1 He appears to have been an ex-
ponent of a theophilosophical school of jurisprudence, hold-
ing that there is no essential conflict between Faith and
Reason. 2
Particularly did a matured Roman law afford opportuni-
ties for juridical speculation in the era of the great juriscon-
sults in the first few centuries, A. D. From the end of the
Republic, Roman jurisprudence identified law and morals,
subordinating law and the makers of law, whether judges
or legislators, to the overriding veto power of the ethics of
a natural law. A jurisprudential climax was reached with the
of conduct and the ideal of good legislation, with the notion of the law formed
by the usages and approved by the common sense of all nations as embodying
what was practically useful and convenient, satisfied both the philosophical and
the historical instincts of the jurist." See WALTON, HisTOrICAL INTRODUCTION
TO THE RoMAN LAW (2d ed.) 355 ff.
10 ZuLuETA, op .dt. supra note 8, at 868 ff.
11 Thus in his work De Republica (Bk. III, ch. 22), Cicero wrote: "Right
reason is indeed a true law, in accord with nature, diffused among all men, un-
changeable, eternal. By its commands, it calls men to their duty, by its pro-
hibitions it deters them from vice. For the upright, it commands and prohibitions
are not in vain, but neither by commanding nor by prohibiting does it move
the wicked. To pass laws contrary to this law is impious, to derogate from it is
unlawful, to do away with it is wholly impossible. Neither the Senate nor the
people can dispense from it, nor is any ulterior expounder and interpreter to be
sought for. There shall no longer be one law at Rome and another at Athens,
nor shall it prescribe one thing today, and another tomorrow, but one and the
same law eternal and immutable shall be prescribed for all nations and all times,
and the god who shall prescribe, introduce and promulgate this law shall be the
one common lord and supreme ruler of all, and whosoever- will refuse obedience
to him shall be filled with confusion, as this very act will be a virtual denial of
his human nature;. and should he escape a present punishment, he shall thave
to endure heavy chastisement hereafter." In the Pro Milone, he stated: "There
is a law, judges, not written, but born within us, which we have not learned or
received by tradition, or read but which we took in and imbibed from nature
itself, which we were not trained in, but which is ingrained in us."
12 For example, he wrote in his Philippics (xi, 12): "Law is nothing else
than right reason derived from the gods, commanding what is honorable and
forbidding the contrary."
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entrance of the immortal Ulpian in the juristic arena. Adopt-
ing a Stoic concept of natural law, he wrote:
"Natural law is that which nature teaches to all animals, for this
law is 'not peculiar to the human race, but affects all creatures which
deduce their origin from the sea, or the land, and it is also common to
birds ... for we see that all animals and even wild beasts appear to
be acquainted with this law." 1s
Positive law, which of course is not philosophy, was obvious-
ly affected at this time by this Stoic concept of natural law.
The jus gentium, with its sustaining philosophical ally,
namely, Stoicism, triumphed in 212, A. D., when the Em-
peror Caracalla conferred Roman citizenship upon practical-
ly all freemen of the Empire. 4 Perhaps there was a causal
connection between this extension of citizenship, and Stoic
philosophy which resisted narrow nationalism. But the phil-
osophy of Stoicism began to be superseded by that of Chris-
tianity, when about a century later, Constantine recognized
Christianity as the religion of the Roman state. Thereafter
Roman law responded to the influence of a new concept of
natural law, more authoritative, and more discriminating
than the Stoical, as to the difference between Reason and
Instinct. A personal God was now postulated instead of a
materialistic pantheism. The result was that the law of
Rome became even more sensitive to the necessity of dis-
criminating between mala fides and bona fides, between the
deliberate and the accidental, and between the letter and
the spirit of law, than ever before.
At the time of Justinian (483-565, A. D.), Roman jurists
were continuing to insist upon the highly ethical character
of Roman jurisprudence. Thus, in his Institutes, the maxims
of law are "to live honorably, not to injure another, to give
to every one his due." " The second sentence of his Institutes
defines jurisprudence as the "Knowledge of things divine
13 DIGS T 1, 1, 1 (3).
14 WALToN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 291.
15 INSTITUTES (Justinian) 1, 1, 3.
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and human, the science of that which is just, as distinguished
from that which is unjust." 16
But during the Patristic era, the "ought" element in law
was usually more theological than philosophical. It seems
that that was a lack of accuracy in legal theophilosophy at
that time. Thus, while the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian
refers to Christ as the Authority upon which the sanction
of his legal compilation rests,"7 still the insertion of Ul-
pian's interpretation of natural law, which is obviously pa-
gan, reveals a failure of philosophical discrimination. It is
common knowledge that it remained for the scholastics, par-
ticularly Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, to show
the possibilities of an adequate theophilosophical jurispru-
dence. From about 754, B. C., to the beginning of the jus
gentium in 243, B. C., approximately, and from the period
of Constantine to the era of the scholastics, the Roman law,
perhaps, derived its chief, though not exclusive, sanctioning
force from belief in some type of divine power perceived by
Faith, rather than by Reason. But this was not true of the
jus gentium, nor of the Roman law after the time of the
scholastics.
II
Ethics, metaphysics, and logic were the three divisions of
philosophy which exercised indirectly, though the media of
Roman judicial and legislative processes, the greatest in-
fluence upon the course of Roman jurisprudence. Many ex-
amples may be cited to indicate the change which was in-
duced in Roman law by an evolving concept of ethics.
Thus, in the earliest Roman law of contracts, the control-
ling ethics had to do with the preservation of prescribed ritu-
als, and the adherence to definite formalisms."8 These were
the sources of legal right. Later with the introduction of a
10 INSTITUTES 1, 1, 1.
17 Thus see the Prooernium of the Institutes of Justinian.
18 MAnrNE, op. dt. supra note 4, at 303 if.
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system of natural law ethics, first, in the Stoic sense, and
finally, in the form of Christianity, the consensual element
in contract law became uppermost. The outer forum became
related to the inner forum. Intent and good faith became
important. Roman jurisprudence began to show and coordi-
nate "in various rules of law, the value and function of the
will (mens, animus), of agreement and of the consequences
of the elements of deceit and bona fides, thus opening up
new pathways for the progress of law." "
In the law of delict, the Stoic concept of natural law and
subsequently the ethics of Christianity upheld the theory
that the mental state was important relative to culpability
and blameworthiness in reference to negligence. It is a com-
monplace that the Roman law of delicts, regulated in con-
siderable detail as early as the Twelve Tables, was originally
based on a penal conception. Despite the reforming effect
which the Lex Aquila (287, B. C.) had upon the Roman law
of delicts, the interpretatio of lex "stereotyped ideas and
rules only to be explained as survivals of a primitive system
of vengeance." 20 The specific effect of natural law jurispru-
dence may be discerned, for example, by the work of the
jurisconsult, C. Aquilius Gallus, during the last years of the
Republic when Stoic speculation had become dominant. He
is credited with the formulae de dolo, malo, most likely pro-
posed by him in a responsum, and with the modernizing of
the old law."' The ethics of Christianity carried forward the
concept that the law of torts was to be primarily compensa-
tory instead of retaliatory.
Ethics of a natural law entered into the forging of the
Roman law of trusts. Their validation was apparently the
result of the developing philosophical sense of Roman juris-
prudence. These testamentary requests, fidecommissa, were
19 Riccobono, Outlines of tke Evolution of Roman Law (1925) 74 U. PA.
L. REv. 3.
20 ZuU.ETA, op. cit. supra note 8, at 861.
21 ZULUETA, op. cit. supra note 8, at 851.
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useful when testators were desirous of giving an inheritance
or legacy to persons, to whom they could not directly give
either.22 It is significant that these devices received legal
recognition in Rome during the period of Augustus, when
natural law ethics predominated."
The history of Roman family law is a movement from
formalism to rationalism. The nzanus-marriage of the old
Roman law became gradually supplanted by the free-mar-
riage, that is, the concept of the subjection of the wife to
the husband disappeared with the rise of the jus gentium.
Necessary verbal formularies in reference to the marriage
ceremony disappeared, and consensus became important.24
The ethics of a natural law philosophy similarly broke down
the objectivism of patria potestas.25
Metaphysically, the Roman law, both public and private,
was affected by a supra-actual, generalizing manner of view-
ing things and groups of individuals. In no small measure,
Roman law owes its superiority, its world-wide appeal, and
its lasting quality, to the strongly supra-physical features
which characterize it. With the introduction of rational spec-
ulation into Rome, jurists there began to perceive the meta-
physical relationships between realities. They started to
fabricate juristic universals, such as maxims and general
principles in the field of law.
Roman jurisconsults, praetors, legal authors, jural philos-
ophers, and wielders of the legislative authority forged
specific legal positive rules under a metaphysics of personal-
ity. Various applications were made of the principle which
justified jurists giving new forms to actual entities by a
process of imagination. Thus the treasury of the State and
various groups were personified, giving rise to the corpora-
22 INSTI TuEs (Justinian) 2, 23, 1.
23 SoHm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 477.
24 SoHm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 359 ff.
25 SoHm, op. dt. supra note 1, at 385 ff.
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tion and the notion of Roman legal personality.2" Again, the
concept of the Roman universal successor,27 who, by a fic-
tion, was regarded as the deceased, and the hereditas
jacens,28 that is, an inheritance not yet vested, which as-
sumed legal personality by a metaphysical process, are fur-
ther examples of the exercise of the imaginative faculty,
functioning in accordance with reason.
The efficient overcoming of legal difficulties sometimes
demanded a combination of metaphysics and ethics. For
example, reason, conceding that the personified group, in the
instance of the universitas personarum, the quasi-fictional-
ized mass of money, land, or property, in the case of the
universitas bonorum, and the anthropomorphized charitable
foundation, in regard to the pia causa,29 after the ascendency
of Christianity at Rome, were useful metaphysical, juristic
instruments for the attainment of unity and continuity, at-
tributes of philosophical perfection, demanded, nevertheless
that the new realities should be responsible for their acts on
the basis of moral necessity. Thus metaphysics served the
ends of right reason.
But the conflict of ethics and metaphysics in the very early
Roman law might be seen in the personification of the kin-
dred, which alone was the unit of legal rights and duties. As
this metaphysical formula excluded the individual from par-
ticipation in the benefits of positive law, on the theory that
the fiction should blot out the underlying substratum of
rationality, this device was evidently being used to over-
ride reason. Since reason was superior to imagination, how-
ever, this personification was gradually demolished by an ir-
resistibly emergent ethics of a natural law.
A by-product of the metaphysical method was the wide-
spread employment of fictions. A legal fiction has been de-
26 Amos, TuE HISTORY AND PFcISLFS OF THE C CW LAW OF Roin (1883)
119 ff.
27 RADiN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 397.
28 RAmn, op. cit. supra note 5, at 398 ff.
2V 2 S _ ANs, op. cit. supra note 3, at 120.
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scribed by Sir Henry Maine as "any assumption which con-
ceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has
undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its
operation being modified." 30 Illustrations of this device in
Roman law include, for example, the fiction of the Lex
Cornelia, by means of which a Roman citizen, if he died a
captive, was regarded as having died at the very instant of
his capture for the purpose of allowing testamentary laws
to be operative,31 the fiction of Adoption, which allowed the
family bond to be fashioned artificially,"2 and the "actio
fictitia," which permitted the praetor to pretend that there
had been a compliance with a condition of the law contrary
to actuality. 3
Finally, the Roman law owed much to Greek logic and
rhetoric. 4 The beginning of the science of Roman law coin-
cided with the Stoic era. Numerous illustrations of the in-
fluence of Greek logic may be given. For instance, it was
during the Stoic era of Roman history that Q. Mucius first
applied definitional methods to the juristic field, and utilized
the idea of classification by means of species and genera. 5
The rhetorical, interpretative technique, borrowed from
Greek philosophy, was the proximate reason for the substi-
tution of voluntas in place of verba, as the ultimate deter-
minant of legal meaning."
In retrospect, therefore, the principal basis of Roman jur-
isprudence seems to have been different in the various
epochs. At first, it was, in a general way, pagan theology
30 MAnE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 25.
81 See DIGEST 28, 1, 12.
32 MAINE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 29, 26.
83 SANDARS, THE INsTrrUTES or JusTniNi (1876) 508, 509.
84 See SROUX, SuMMUM Jus SuMMA INJURIA (1926). Note Enmcr,
FUNDAMNTAL PRINCIPLES Or THE SocioLOGy OF LAW (trans. by Moll 1936) 268,
where it is stated: "The fact that the Roman law, as early as the days of the
jurists of the later Republic, seems to be a well ordered and perfect structure,
containing a great number of universal legal propositions, must be attributed to
the fact that the Roman jurists were not only practicing lawyers, but also
writers and teachers."
85 ZuLuETA, op. cit. supra note 8, at 869.
86 ZuLuETA, op. cit. supra note 8, at 870.
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and patrician infallibility, later on the Stoic concept of nat-
ural law, eventually Christian theology, which modified the
Greek notion of natural law, and lastly, the theophilosophi-
cal culture of the scholastics. A knowledge of this shifting of
background makes more intelligible such phases of the Rom-
an law as those of the pagan pontifical monopoly, of the jus
civile, of the jus gentium, and of the later jus gentium, as
worked out under the sway of Christianity. Manifestly there
were other considerations which were also material in the
process of evaluating and deciding upon rules of law, but
they do not seem to have changed materially the general
direction which had been ordained by the pole star of theo-
philosophy. It appears that the great stages in the history
of Roman law, however, were not created by constitutional
changes, for the second or classical or Romano-Hellenic
period of Roman private law began prior to the termination
of the Republic."
In this day of jurisprudential emphasis, and politico-con-
stitutional controversy, perspective and illumination may
be had by recourse to the history of the philosophy of the
world's most famous legal system, Roman law. Because of
the universality of human nature, the lessons which may be
learned from that system must command the attention of
the American jurist. From the jurisprudence of the Roman
law, may not several major conclusions be drawn? Does it
not show, first, that law cannot be indefinitely divorced from
philosophy, particularly ethics, metaphysics, and logic; sec-
ondly, that the philosophy of a natural law, inasmuch as it is
more ultimate than other systems of philosophy, will ulti-
mately prevail; and thirdly, that the respective weights of
formalism and equity ought to be weighed in the scales of
reason?
Brendan F. Brown.
The Catholic University of America, School of Law.
87 ZuLUETA, oP. ct..supra note 8, at 842.
